

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5487

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 BUDAPEST 0789

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, HU

SUBJ: MARCH 10 CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN PUJA: TOUR D'HORIZON

REF: STATE 056285, BUDAPEST 755

1. DURING MARCH 10 MARATHON SESSION (FROM 1000-1400) WITH MCAULIFFE TO REVIEW INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS, PUJA WAS IN MOST RELAXED AND FRIENDLY MODD HE HAS EVER DISPLAYED TO AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL. SESSION DIVIDED INTO FOUR PARTS WITH PUJA FIRST MAKING LONG PRESENTATION ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, TO WHICH MCAULIFFE RESPONDED ONLY A LITTLE MORE SUCCINCTLY--FOLLOWED BY FONMIN'S PRESENTATION ON BILATERAL ISSUES AFTER WHICH MCAULIFFE PRESENTED U.S. VIEWS. THIS MESSAGE COVERS FIRST TWO PARTS DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS; PARTS THREE AND FOUR FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

2. EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCENE: IN LIGHT OF SOME DEBATES WHICH ARE NOW "RESURGING" PUJA SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF GOH AND USG VIEWS ON POST-CSCE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. GOH, HE SAID, CONTINUES TO PURSUE POLICY FIRMLY COMMITTED TO PEACE AND SECURITY WITH SPECIAL  
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EMPHASIS ON EUROPE. GOH IS CONVINCED THAT WDATEGS

GOVERNMENTS HAVE THE SAME GOALS ALTHOUGH SOME "EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL FORCES" IN THE WEST ARE SHOWING SIGNS THEY DESIRE A LESS CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE.

3. PUJA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT EVENTS IN FRG, EMPHASIZING THAT HE WAS NOT REPEAT NOT TALKING ABOUT GOVERNMENT OF HELMUT SCHMIDT. HE SAID THAT UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS ALREADY CREATING SOME UNFAVORABLE EFFECTS ON FRG FOREIGN POLICY. HE ADDED THAT IF ON MARCH 10 BUNDESRAT WERE TO RATIFY THE POLAND-GERMAN AGREEMENTS THIS ADVERSE PRESSURE MAY EASE; BUT VIEWS WHICH GOH DOES NOT LIKE ON "SUBJECTS LIKE REUNIFICATION AND WEST BERLIN" ARE GIVING RISE TO A CERTAIN STRESS FROM TIME TO TIME.

4. NOT ONLY IN THE FRG BUT ELSEWHERE IN WEST TOO, PUJA CONTINUED, THERE SEEMED TO BE CAMPAIGNS UNDER WAY WHOSE MAIN TARGET IS THE SOVIET UNION. THESE CAMPAIGNS ARE POISONOUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND THEY ADVERSELY AFFECT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. IN PUJA'S VIEW THESE UNHEALTHY POLITICAL TRENDS STEM FROM THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE WEST WHICH HE SAID ARE ALSO AFFECTING HUNGARY'S FOREIGN TRADE VERY UNFAVORABLY. HE NOTED THAT SOVIET UNION AND CEMA HAD ALSO RAISED THEIR RAW MATERIALS PRICES; BUT PRICE INCREASES RESULTING FROM TRADE WITH BUDAPEST'S "SOCIALIST" PARTNERS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ONE-THIRD OF HUNGARY'S FOREIGN TRADE DEFICIT, WHILE TWO-THIRDS OF THE DEFICIT IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO WESTERN PRICE HIKES EVEN THOUGH HUNGARY'S COMMERCE WITH THE WEST CONSTITUTES ONLY ONE-THIRD OF THE VOLUME OF ITS FOREIGN TRADE.

5. PUJA SAID THAT, IN SPITE OF WHAT SOME WESTERNERS MAY THINK OR SAY, COMMUNISTS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN SEEING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE WEST CONTINUE OR DEEPEN. ECONOMIC ADVERSITY CAN HAVE A POLITICAL OUTCOME AND CAUSE A TURN TO THE RADICAL RIGHT. PUJA ASSERTED THAT MARXIST ANALYSES INDICATE THAT CONDITIONS FOR A LEFT-WING REVOLUTION IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE CLEARLY NOT RIPE, BUT THAT THERE REMAINS THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN ABRUPT TURN TO THE

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RIGHT.

6. PUJA THEN DWELLED AT LENGTH IN GREAT DETAIL ON RECENT VISIT OF DUTCH FONMIN VAN DER STOEL, CLEARLY INDICATING THAT THEIR TALKS HAD CAUSED HIM SEVERE DISCOMFORT. VAN DER STOEL, HE SAID, BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE, CHARGING THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO HELSINKI. PUJA HAD COUNTERED THAT NEITHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO GIVE UP ITS

IDEOLOGY. HE MAINTAINED WITH APPARENT SINCERITY THAT HE GENUINELY SEES IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO SYSTEMS AS BEING ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS OR TRADE BETWEEN STATES WHICH CAN OBVIOUSLY GO ON AND EXPAND TO MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES. "AFTER ALL, IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IS NOT ARMED CONFLICT," PUJA ADDED FOR EMPHASIS. FONMIN THEN QUOTED FIRST SECRETARY KADAR AS HAVING TOLD VAN DER STOEL THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD STOP THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE EVEN IF THEY WANTED TO DO SO AND PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO DO SO. PUJA LAMENTED THAT DUTCH FONMIN HAD MISUNDERSTOOD AND HAD CONFUSED IDEOLOGY WITH EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES SUCH AS PORTUGAL. VAN DER STOEL HAD SAID THAT ATTEMPT BY SMALL GROUP OF PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS TO SEIZE POWER IN LISBON CONSTITUTED ONE MANIFESTATION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE WITH WHICH GON COULD NEVER AGREE. PUJA SAID HE THEN TOLD DUTCH FONMIN THAT PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS ARE TOO WELL INFORMED AND TOO INTELLIGENT NOT TO HAVE KNOWN THAT SEIZURE OF POWER IN THIS WAY WOULD BE TRAGIC MISTAKE. TO ASSUME THAT MOSCOW GAVE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS SUCH "ORDERS" WOULD BE ANOTHER GREAT MISTAKE. MOSCOW WOULD NEVER UNDER EXISTING OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS HAVE URGED A PARTY TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A HOPELESS TASK. VAN DER STOEL, HE CLAIMED, HAD EVEN MIXED UP SOME EXTREME LEFT-WING GROUPS--INCLUDING SOME IN PORTUGUESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT--WITH THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY. ALL THIS HOWEVER, PUJA CONTENDED, HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. THE GON EXPECTS TO BE CRITICIZED IN THE WEST, BUT VINDICTIVE, MALEVOLENT "POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS" ARE ANOTHER THING, PUJA CONCLUDED.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5488

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 6 BUDAPEST 0789

7. CSCE: TURNING TO CSCE PUJA STATED THAT GOH WILL STRIVE TO GIVE TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION TO ALL PROVISIONS OF FINAL ACT, BEING FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT FURTHER PROGRESS ON MANY OTHER ISSUES IS PRE-CONDITIONED BY IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI DECLARATION. ONE ESSENTIAL PRE-CONDITION TO FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE, PUJA BELIEVED, WAS CONTINUED PROGRESS IN ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT TALKS. CSCE HAS BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASPECTS, PUJA CONTINUED: ON THE BILATERAL SIDE GOH IS EXAMINING CSCE DECLARATION CAREFULLY AND WISHES TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP ON COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS TO CONCRETE, SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS DESIGNED TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION. GOH WILL WITHIN ONE OR TWO MONTHS PROPOSE TO USG SPECIFIC STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN WITHIN CLEARLY DEFINED AREAS; AND HE FULLY EXPECTED THAT U.S. WOULD MAKE SIMILAR PROPOSALS TO GOH. EVEN IF ALL PROPOSALS FROM BOTH SIDES COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AT ONCE OR CONCURRENTLY, HE HOPED ALL COULD BE RESOLVED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OVER A LONGER PERIOD. GOH WILL LAY GREAT STRESS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT RECIPROCITY SO THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL DERIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM ANY SINGLE AGREEMENT. HUNGARIANS WILL TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT DOMESTIC LAWS OF COUNTRIES  
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WITH WHICH THEY DEAL; AND THEY WILL SHUN PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT APPEAR TO SOME TO REPRESENT INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY.

8. CITING AN EXAMPLE, PUJA TURNED TO QUESTION OF VISAS WHICH HE HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED WITH "SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES" OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS. IN THIS AREA HE HAD ENCOUNTERED RATHER STRICT AND RIGID RESPONSE WHICH HAD SURPRISED HIM. DUTCH FONMIN HAD ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH OBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISSUANCE OF VISAS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO HUNGARIANS (AND VICE VERSA) TO "VERY SEPARATE" TOPIC OF ISSUANCE OF HUNGARIAN PASSPORTS TO HUNGARIANS "WITHOUT TAKING THE TROUBLE OF INFORMING HIMSELF ABOUT THE FACTS." (COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER PUJA MEANT THAT VAN DER STOEL DID NOT PERCEIVE THAT THESE SUBJECTS ARE DIFFERENT OR THAT VAN DER STOEL WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH HUNGARY'S RELATIVELY LIBERAL POLICY OF PASSPORT ISSUANCE.)

9. PUJA NEXT SPOKE OF CULTURAL AND INFORMATION EXCHANGES

SAYING THAT HUNGARY IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN CONTENT AND SUBSTANCE: GOH WANTS ONLY THE BEST OF WESTERN CULTURAL PRODUCTS ALONG WITH THE REVERSE-NAMELY, TO EXPORT THE BEST OF HUNGARIAN CULTURAL FARE.

10. ON THE INFORMATION QUESTION PUJA SAID THAT HUNGARIAN POLICY IS QUITE LIBERAL. GOH DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH RADIO OR TELEVISION BROADCASTS, OR WITH THE RIGHT OF ITS CITIZENS TO LISTEN TO ANY STATION THEY WISH; AND YUGOSLAV AND AUSTRIAN RADIO-TELEVISION CAN BE SEEN AND HEARD IN ALMOST ALL OF HUNGARY. INCREASED CIRCULATION OF WESTERN NEWSPAPERS WAS BEING OVER-STRESSED. THE GOH IS EXAMINING MATTER IN SPIRIT OF HELSINKI DECLARATION BUT ONE THING MUST BE CLEAR: GOH DOES NOT INTEND TO ALLOW ENTRY OF NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS WHICH CARRY CLEARLY MALICIOUS ALLEGATIONS AND FALSIFICATIONS AGAINST THEM. MAGYARS DO NOT OBJECT TO HONEST, VALID CRITICISM; MAGYARS CAN EVEN LEARN FROM IT. THEY KNOW ALL TOO WELL THEY ARE NOT PERFECT AND THEY TOO CAN MAKE MISTAKES. BUT "TO ALWAYS SAY THAT A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IS THE CURSE OF GOD ON HUNGARY IS NOT PERMISSIBLE." "AFTER ALL," HE ADDED QUIZZICALLY, "WHO KNOWS, MAYBE A NON-COMMUNIST

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REGIME WOULD BE WORSE." DISSEMINATION OF PUBLICATIONS CONTAINING SIMILAR UNTRUTHS ABOUT HUNGARY'S ALLIES IS ALSO NOT PERMISSIBLE IN HUNGARY. FOR THESE REASONS GOH BELIEVES THAT A BILATERAL APPROACH TO INFORMATION QUESTIONS IS ALSO PREFERABLE BECAUSE THEN THE TWO PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES CAN DEAL WITH EACH OTHER IN SPECIFIC TERMS. THERE SHOULD BE NO PRECONCEPTIONS THAT ALL COUNTRIES BELONGING TO A CERTAIN POLITICAL GROUP ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER BELONG IN PRECISELY THE SAME CATEGORY.

1. ON DISARMAMENT PUJA SAID GOH HAS DEEP AND ABIDING INTEREST IN PROGRESS IN SALT TALKS AS WELL AS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS GENERALLY SINCE THEY ARE OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE AND HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT ON TOTALITY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR IS DESIRABLE WHETHER IN THE UN OR ELSEWHERE. PUJA THEN TURNED TO THE MBFR TALKS SAYING HE DID NOT SHARE THE OPINION OF "CERTAIN" WEST EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO HAVE GIVEN IMPRESSION THAT IF NOTHING HAPPENS IN VIENNA BY 1977, DETENTE WOULD COME TO AN END. GOH SEES MATTERS DIFFERENTLY AND STILL CONFIDENTLY BELIEVES THAT SOONER OR LATER THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT IN VIENNA. "SOCIALIST STATES" CONSIDER THAT INCLUSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MBFR TALKS CONSTITUTED STEP FORWARD BY WEST EVEN IF THE FORMER DID NOT YET CONSIDER THE SPECIFICS OF THE OFFER ACCEPTABLE. SIMILARLY, PUJA BELIEVES

THAT LATEST SOCIALIST PROPOSAL IS ADDITIONAL USEFUL STEP FORWARD BECAUSE IT INCORPORATED THE IDEA THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF TROOP REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE A US-SOVIET REDUCTION FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE INVOLVING OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE LOOKS FORWARDHCO PARNING WESTERN RESPONSE TO THIS LATEST PROPOSAL. SOME PEOPLE MAY THINK EASTERN PROPOSAL IS ONE-SIDED; BUT, IN OPINION OF "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES," THE WESTERN PROPOSALS HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED EITHER IN SUBMITTING A PROPOSAL WHICH WILL INSURE EQUAL AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES.

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12. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PUJA SAID GOH POSITION IS WELL KNOWN: NAMELY, THAT THE LATEST PARTIAL AGREEMENT DOES NOT BRING THE SITUATION CLOSER TO SOLUTION. MIDDLE EAST NOW APPEARS TO BE ON A DEAD-END STREET FROM WHICH HE DID NOT SEE A WAY OUT. THE EGYPTIANS, HE SAID, ARE ADVOCATING RENEWAL OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, WITHOUT RECOGNITION OF THE PLO, PUJA DID NOT SEE HOW THIS COULD COME ABOUT. IT MIGHT HAVE WORKED IN 1968, HE CONTINUED, BUT PLO HAS NOW BECOME THE CENTRAL POLITICAL ISSUE. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW ISRAEL IN ITS STRONGLY REINFORCED MILITARY POSITION WOULD BE WILLING TO ADHERE NOW TO THE PERTINENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SOME

MIGHT SAY, PUJA MUSED, THAT THE PRESENT STATUS QUO IS SATISFACTORY BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT ARMED CONFLICT COULD BREAK OUT AT ANY TIME AND THIS WOULD HAVE TWO OR MORE COUNTRIES FACING EACH OTHER AND ENDANGERING THEIR NEIGHBORS AND EVERYONE ELSE ONCE AGAIN.

13. TURNING TO THE UN RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM, PUJA THEN OFFERED A FAIRLY DETAILED JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOH VOTE. HE STRESSED THAT IS WAS NOT THE "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" CONFIDENTIAL

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WHICH INTRODUCED THE RESOLUTION, BUT THE ARABS. GOH HAS HAD A POSITION ON ZIONISM FOR A LONG TIME; IT HAS NOT CHANGED. HOWEVER, ONCE THE RESOLUTION WAS INTRODUCED AT THE UN, HUNGARY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO VOTE FOR IT. THIS HAPPENING ONLY UNDERLINED HIS OWN FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE UN WAS NOT A SUITABLE FORUM FOR DEBATING IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. AND THEN PUJA AGAIN STRESSED THAT THE "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" DID NOT DRAFT OR INTRODUCE THE RESOLUTION AND DID NOT INSTIGATE THE ARABS TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.

14. ON ANGOLA, THE GOH HAS STEADFASTLY SUPPORTED THE MPLA SINCE 1961 IN THE STRUGGLE TO END COLONIALISM, A POLICY WHICH HE JUDGED WAS IN HARMONY WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. WHAT HAPPENED IN ANGOLA RECENTLY, HE SAID, WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED HAD THERE BEEN NO SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION. BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION, PUJA ASSERTED, THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENTERED ANGOLA AS EARLY AS AUGUST 1975 AND IN PUJA'S VIEW TRIED TO PRESENT THE MPLA WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY THE TIME INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED. "UNDER THESE

CIRCUMSTANCES THEMPLA APPEALED TO US FOR HELP. THE SOVIET UNION SENT MATERIEL, ARMS AND ADVISORS; AND THE CUBANS SENT SOLDIERS." PUJA SAID HE BELIEVED THE NUMBER OF CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA WAS GROSSLY EXAGGERATED, ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT FIGURE.

15. IN ANY EVENT, PUJA EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AN INTERNAL RECONCILIATION WILL NOW BECOME POSSIBLE AND THAT ORDER WILL BE RESTORED. MANY COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THE USSR HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT IT DOES NOT WISH TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY PRESENCE THERE. ACCORDINGLY, HE BELIEVED THE RTIME HAD COME TO REMOVE THIS QUESTION FROO THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA.

16. PUJA THEN RECOUNTED HIS IMPRESSIONS ON HIS RECENT TWAS

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IN VIET-NAM HE FOUND  
A STRONG, DEVELOPING  
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STATE WITH GROWING INFLUENCE WHOSE GOAL IS THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND WHOSE DESIRE IS TO CONCENTRATE ON SOLVING ITS MANY SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. HE FELT CONFIDENT THE VIETNAMESE WILL SUCCEED AND THAT IN A FEW YEARS THEY WILL HAVE A STRONG ECONOMY. THE VIETNAMESE REPORTEDLY TOLD PUJA THAT THEY ARE READY TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, "NATURALLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THEIR CLAIMS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BE SATISFIEDJZ THEY WANT TO INCLUDE PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT PLANS; AND HE TOLD OF VISITING A JAPANESE COMPANY WHICH IS PROSPERING AND EVEN EXPANDING ITS OPERATIONS THERE. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS RECEPTIVE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE TWO AND ONE-HALF MILLION UNEMPLOYED AND ONLY A PORTION OF THESE CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO GAINFUL WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTION.

17. IN LAOS, PUJA WENT ON TO SAY, THINGS ARE "GOING WELL;" BUT THAT IN CAMBODIA, GOH DID NOT FEEL IT KNEW WHAT IS GOING ON. "IF REPORTS ARE TRUE, SOME OF THE MEASURES THEY ARE TAKING ARE DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. SOME ATTRIBUTE THIS TO THE YOUTH AND INEXPERIENCE OF THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP WHO THINK THAT LARGE GROUPS CAN BE EXPELLED FROM CITIES AND RESETTLED. THIS IS HARD FOR HUNGARIANS TO FATHOM AND THE VIETNAMESE DON'T UNDERSTAND IT EITHER."

18. PUJA EXPRESSED CONVERN ABOUT WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS A TENDENCY AMONG THE ASIAN COUNTRIES TO CREATE SOME FORM OF "MILITARY BLOC." IN HIS RECENT TALKS WITH THE SINGAPORE FONMIN, THE LATTER HAD DENIED SUCH PLANS; YET OTHERS SEEMED TO BE TALING ABOUT IT. SUCH A STEP WOULD, IN HIS VIEW, AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN ASIA AND BE PART OF AN ANTI-VIETNAM TENDENCY. FINALLY, PUJA CONCLUDED HIS REVIEW ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS BY BRIEFLY SAYING THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS GOING ON IN CHINA AND THAT MAYBE MCAULIFFE ON BASIS OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USG COULD ENLIGHTEN HIM ON THAT SUBJECT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 6 BUDAPEST 0789

19. MCAULIFFE'S RESPONSE: AS PUJA CONCLUDED HIS SIXTY-FIVE MINUTE PRESENTATION, MCAULIFFE QUICKLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF OFFICIAL GOH POSITIONS ON MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS AND SAID HE WISHED TO RESPOND BEFORE FONMIN ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO BILATERAL ISSUES.

20. ON WEST GERMANY, MCAULIFFE SAID, IT WAS HIS FIRM CONVICTION THAT EVER SINCE ITS FOUNDING IN 1949 FRG HAS HAD EXCELLENT GOVERNMENTS. ONE FEDERAL REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT AFTER ANOTHER UNDER DIFFERENT CHANCELLORS FROM DIFFERENT POLITICAL PARTIES HAD PROVED THEMSELVES GOOD FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF THE U.S. AND GOOD NEIGHBORS OF THE EUROPEAN STATES ON THEIR BORDERS. BONN HAD DEMONSTRATED A UNIFORMLY POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS; AND HE PERSONALLY SAW NO REASON TO EXPECT A CHANGE IN THAT ATTITUDE IN THE FUTURE. DESPITE CURRENT TEMPORARY ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, FRG--THANKS TO TALENT AND INDUSTRY OF GERMAN PEOPLE--ENJOY LIVING STANDARD THAT IS ENVY OF MOST NATIONS.

21. DURING HIS PRESENTATION, FONMIN HAD MADE PASSING

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REFERENCE TO DR. KONRAD ADENAUER, CONTRASTING "NEGATIVE POLITICAL ATTITUDE" OF LATTER WITH POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF CHANCELLORS BRANDT AND SCHMIDT. MCAULIFFE SAID WITH A SMILE THAT IF THE EAST DID NOT CARE TOO MUCH FOR KONRAD ADENAUER, PUJA COULD BE CERTAIN THAT WALTHER ULBRICHT HAD NO GREATER POPULARITY IN THE WEST (PUJA BROKE OUT LAUGHING). MCAULIFFE FELT CERTAIN THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THAT TIME THE BERLIN AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. TODAY IN 1976, THANKS TO EFFORTS BY THE FOUR POWERS AND BY FRG AND GDR, BERLIN IS NO LONGER A FLASH POINT. IN FACT, HAD THE BERLIN QUESTION NOT BEEN NORMALIZED IN LARGE MEASURE, MCAULIFFE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL DOUBTS THAT CSCE TALKS COULD EVER HAVE BEGUN. PUJA AGREED.

22. MCAULIFFE WELCOMED HUNGARY'S EFFORTS TO INSURE PEACE AND SECURITY EVERYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. NO GOVERNMENT ON EARTH IS MORE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AND IN EUROPE THAN AMERICA. DURING THIS CENTURY THE U.S. HAS BEEN DRAWN INTO TWO WORLD WARS. IT WAS NOT AN AGGRESSOR; IT HAD NO IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS; IT DID NOT DECLARE WAR, OTHER POWERS DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA. THE U.S. SACRIFICED BLOOD AND TREASURE TO HELP WIN BOTH WORLD WARS; AND WHEN PEACE FINALLY CAME THE U.S. TWICE HELPED TO RECONSTRUCT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT HAD BEEN DEVASTATED. TSU  
PIDM ZM HAS ADJUSTED  
NO BORDERS TO INCREASE ITS TERRITORY. FOR OVER THREE DECADES UNDER MANY PRESIDENTS THE U.S. HAS STEADILY SOUGHT TO INSURE PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

23. MCAULIFFE SAID IT IS HIS HABIT TO EXAMINE THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCENE IN A SIMPLE MATRIX--ACTUALLY THROUGH FOUR DIFFERENT PRISMS. FIRST THERE ARE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, THE U.S. AND THE USSR, WHICH ARE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AND INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. NEXT THERE ARE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE WHICH--WHETHER GOOD OR BAD--SOMETIMES CAUSE ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON. THE THIRD CATEGORY CONSISTS OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE WHICH --WHETHER IMPROVING  
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OR DETERIORATING--SOMETIMES MAKE MOSCOW NERVOUS. FINALLY,

THE FOURTH GROUP, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THOSE OF WESTERN EUROPE WHICH ARE WATCHED ATTENTIVELY BUT IN A SOMEWHAT MORE RELAXED FASHION IN BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IN THIS FRAMEWORK, MCAULIFFE AGAIN STRESSED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT SALT I AND THE FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT ON BERLIN HAD ON MAKING CSCE, THE HELSINKI DECLARATION AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE. MAIN TASK IN 1976 IS TO FIND MEANINGFUL, CONSTRUCTIVE FORMS OF IMPLEMENTING HELSINKI DOCUMENT.

24. ON MBFR TALKS, MCAULIFFE SAID HE WAS NOT COMPLETELY UP-TO-DATE ON VIENNA TALKS AND WAS CERTAINLY IN NO POSITION TO DISCUSS THEIR SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, HE SHARED FONMIN'S OPTIMISM THAT TALKS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO AGREEMENT AMONG PARTICIPANTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS FOR ALL OF EUROPE SO THAT UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL CAN BE MAINTAINED--AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN ENHANCED AT LOWER TROOP LEVELS. IN CERTAIN RESPECTS MBFR EVEN MORE COMPLICATED THAN BILATERAL SALT TAKS BECAUSE SO MANY SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES ARE INVOLVED--AS BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT PARTICIPANTS--AND EVEN NON-PARTICIPATING STATES LIKE AUSTRIA AND YUGO-SLAVIA HAVE GREAT AND UNDERSTANDABLE POLITICAL INTEREST IN EVENTUAL OUTOOOME. THERE IS NO SIMPLE FORMULA TO DETERMINE "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" FOR EACH COUNTRY AND FOR EACH SIDE. EACH SOVEREIGN COUNTRY HAD TO DETERMINE BY ITS OWN PROCESS WHAT REPRESENTED UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ITSELF; AND IT JUST POSSIBLE THAT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAVE CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTS. IT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT ANY EVENTUAL VIENNA AGREEMENT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORSEEABLE FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN YEARS TO COME AND MAKE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR THEM. OTHERWISE NATIONAL LEADERS WOULD BE BLAMED FOR A LACK OF PRUDENCE AND THE RESULTING PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION COULD DESTABLIZE THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION.

25. RECALLING THAT IN FONMIN'S RECENT ARTICLE IN TARSADALMI SZEMLE THERE HAD APPEARED SOME PASSING REFERENCE TO U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET, MCAULIFFE THEN PRESENTED TO PUJA A STATISTICAL TABLE  
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(BASED ON USIA CIRCULAR 6204) COMPARING AMERICAN AND SOVIET DEFENSE BUDGETS AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES. THE TABLE SHOWED THAT THE USSR ENJOYS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WEAPONRY; BUT MCAULIFFE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS ARE VERY DIFFERENT: THE U.S. HAS TWO FRIENDLY POWERS ON ITS BORDERS AND UNDEFENDED FRONTIERS; THE USSR HAS A LONG LAND FRONTIER AND IS

BORDERED BY TEN NATIONS. PUJA GRINNED AND SAID NINE DO NOT COUNT. MCAULIFFE CALLED ATTENTION TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT THAT U.S. SHOULD POSSESS "MILITARY CAPABILITY SECOND TO NONE" AND OBSERVED THAT TRENDS ARE ALL IMPORTANT: CREATION OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS, AND IT SOMETIMES REVEALS POLITICAL INTENTIONS.

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26. PUJA'S EYES OPENED WISE UPON SEEING THE TABLE AND HE ASKED IMMEDIATELY WHERE MCAULIFFE OBTAINED HIS STATISTICS ON SOVIET ARMAMENTS. "THIS IS VERY INTERESTING, THE SOVIETS NEVER PUBLISH THEIR STATISTICS," HE SAID. "WHERE DID YOU GET THIS?" MCAULIFFE SAID THE U.S. IS NOT TOTALLY WITHOUT MEANS OF OBTAINING SUCH INFORMATION. PUJA SHOOK HIS HEAD IN PUZZLEMENT AND REMARKED: "IN THAT CASE, WHY ARE YOU SO CRITICAL PUBLICLY OF YOUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES?"

27. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MCAULIFFE STATED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD INVESTED EVERY OUNCE OF HIS PRODIGIOUS ENERGY AND STRENGTH WORKING TIRELESSLY FOR PEACE IN THAT TROUBLED AREA. ONE NOW HEARS VOICES OF CRITICS,

ABROAD AND AT HOME, WHO SEEM TO WISH TO DISREGARD WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS ACCOMPLISHED. THERE IS PEACE IN THE AREA. IT MAY BE AN UNEASY PEACE, BUT THERE IS NO OPEN WARFARE; AND IN ONE DIMENSION AT LEAST--ALONG ONE FRONT-- THERE HAS BEEN NOTABLE PROGRESS TO WHICH AMERICA IS MAKING SIZEABLE CONTRIBUTION IN HONEST EFFORT TO CALM NERVES ON BOTH SIDES. NO ONE COULD BE SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS; BUT NO OTHER COUNTRY AND NO OTHER STATESMAN  
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HAS PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. PRESENT SITUATION OF CARPING CRITICS REMINDED MCAULIFFE OF FAMOUS WORLD WAR I BRITISH "OLD BILL" CARTOON: TWO SOLDIERS CROUCHING IN SHELL HOLE UNDER HEAVY ENEMY BOMBARDMENT WITH YOUNGER SOLDIER ALMENTING HIS FATE, TO WHICH "OLD BILL" REPLIES:  
"IF YOU KNOW A BETTER HOLE, GO TO IT!"

28. ON ANGOLA, MCAULIFFE STATED FLATLY THAT SITUATION THERE HAS HAD MANY REGRETTABLE REPERCUSSIONS. THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE AFRICANS SHOULD DEVISE AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO AN AFRICAN PROBLEM. THE U.S. DID NOT OPPOSE THE MPLA PER SE. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO A RECENT NEWS REPORT, GULF OIL CORP JUST MADE \$100 MILLION PAYMENT TO GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA. BUT SOVIETS SENT MASSIVE ARMS AID, A MATTER THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HAS DISCUSSED WITH FONMIN GROMYKO IN MOSCOW; AND FIDEL CASTRO SENT MORE THAN 10,000 CUBAN SOLDIERS FROM ONE HEMISPHERE TO ANOTHER ACROSS SOUTH ATLANTIC TO WIN MILITARY VICTORY OVER ANGOLAN ELEMENTS WHO OPPOSED MPLA. THIS GRIM FACT HAS BROUGHT TO A HALT WHAT PROMISED TO BE THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND CUBA. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, MCAULIFFE CONTINUED, TROOPS WHICH CASTRO HAS USED ONCE AS AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAN BE USED AGAIN. THIS IS A SOURCE OF CONCERN IN MANY PLACES IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

29. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF VISAS, MCAULIFFE SAID MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WOULD IMPROVE, AND SO WOULD OVERALL POLITICAL CLIMATE, IF VISAS FOR NEWSMEN WERE FACILITATED, AND IF SERVICES FOR THEM AFTER ARRIVAL IN HUNGARY WERE TO BECOME EASIER. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO AMERICAN NEWSMEN RESIDENT IN HUNGARY, GRANTING OF MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS FOR AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS STATIONED IN BELGRADE, VIENNA OR BONN WHO COME TO HUNGARY REGULARLY WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE. HE CALLED PUJA'S ATTENTION TO EMBASSY'S JANUARY PROPOSAL TO FONOFF'S CONSULAR DIVISION FOR SHORTENING THE TIME OF VISA ISSUANCE FOR OFFICIAL AND DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT HOLDERS FROM 14 TO 7 DAYS. HE WONDERED WHAT DIFFICULTIES THIS CAUSED GOH AND WHY

THERE HAS BEEN NO REPLY OR COUNTERPROPOSAL.

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30. MCAULIFFE EXPRESSED DEEP PERSONAL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT CULTURAL AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN LAST SEPTEMBER ARE PROCEEDING AT SNAIL'S PACE. AGAIN SPEAKING VERY PERSONALLY AND FRANKLY, HE HAD HOPED THAT UMBRELLA AGREEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED BY END OF 1975. SIGNING OF UMBRELLA AGREEMENT ONLY CONSTITUTES FIRST STEP TOWARD CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION THAT WILL BENEFIT BOTH PEOPLES: THERE WILL THEN BE NEED FOR SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENTS AND DETAILED WORK PLANS. MCAULIFFE REVEALED THAT EMBASSY BUDAPEST WAS STUDYING 20 CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR POSSIBLE SUBMISSION TO GOH ONCE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT IS SIGNED IN FIELDS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MANY OTHERS. HOWEVER THESE PROPOSALS ARE ONLY ON PAPER AND THEY CANNOT BE TRANSLATED INTO REALITY AND YIELD BENEFICIAL RESULTS UNLESS THERE IS SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BUDGETARY SUPPORT.

31. ON ZIONISM, MCAULIFFE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS QUESTION GAVE GREAT CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE MANY, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, EQUATED SUPPORT FOR THAT UN RESOLUTION WITH RESURGENCE OF HATED ANTI-SEMITISM. THOSE WHO HONESTLY SEEK REALISTIC MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION WOULD HAVE DONE A REAL SERVICE IF THEY HAD TRIED AND SUCCEEDED IN DISSUADING THEIR ARAB FRIENDS FROM INTRODUCING THAT RESOLUTION IN THE UN. HE CONTRASTED ZIONISM RESOLUTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTIVE FORWARD-LOOKING PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO UN SPECIAL SESSION BY SECRETARY KISSINGER WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ESTABLISHING BETTER ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL.

32. ON THE QUESTION OF "CAMPAIGNS" AGAINST THE USSR, MCAULIFFE REMARKED THAT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY ARE GREAT POWERS AND LARGE TARGETS, RECEIVE MORE THAN THEIR FAIR SHARE OF PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL ABUSE FROM TIME TO TIME. SOME SMALL COUNTRIES SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT SUPERPOWERS ARE ALMIGHTY AND INFALLIBLE. SOME WELL-INTENTIONED PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ARE OVERLY IDEALISTIC AND UNREALISTIC AS TO RATE OF CHANGE THAT MEN AND GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIETY CAN ACHIEVE. IN ANY CASE, GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE

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TO STRIVE TO RESOLVE THOSE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE TRACTABLE  
EVEN THOUGH SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF SUCH ISSUES  
OFTEN RECEIVES FAR LESS PUBLICITY THAN THEY DESERVE.

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USIA-06 ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-11 CU-02 VO-03

SCA-01 NEA-10 AF-06 AID-05 ARA-06 ERDA-05 EB-07 OMB-01

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P 151039Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5492

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33. WHEN MCAULIFFE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION, PUJA  
RETURNED TO SOME OF THE POINTS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED.  
HE SAID GOH IS CAREFUL NOT TO BECOME OVEREXERCISED BY  
SOME ELECTION RHETORIC NOW BEING HEARD IN THE U.S.  
IT WAS WISER AND MORE USEFUL TO WATCH FACTS AND NOTE  
DEE  
C OF USG; AND HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT AFTER THE  
ELECTIONS WHOEVER MAY OCCUPY THE WHITE HOUSE WILL CONTINUE  
PRESENT U.S. POLICY WHICH FAVORS CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT  
OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

34. PUJA SAID PRESENT BASIS FOR EASING OF TENSIONS IS  
ACTUAL EXISTENCE, AND RECOGNITION OF ACTUAL EXISTENCE, OF  
ACCEPTABLE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. IN  
VIENNA IT WAS NOW TIME TO MOVE FORWARD IN CONVENTIONAL  
MILITARY ARMS AS WELL. "WHO KNOWS WHO IS STRONGER;  
YOU SAY OUR WARSAW PACT ARMIES ARE STRONGER, MAYBE  
THEY ARE. BUT WHAT DO WE HAVE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE,  
VERY LITTLE. AND LOOK AT FRANCE, IT DOES NOT EVEN

PARTICIPATE IN VIENNA TALKS; BUT IT IS A STRONG MEMBER  
OF NATO AND EVEN HAS MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN FRG.  
IF ONE MEASURES BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ONLY BY  
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GROUND TROOP REDUCTIONS, NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN IN  
SOUTHERN EUROPE  
AND FRANCE. AIR FORCES ARE STILL NOT  
INCLUDED, ALTHOUGH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW ARE;  
YOU SAY YOU ARE STRONGER IN THAT AREA. IT ALL GOES TO  
SHOW THAT REDUCTIONS HAVE TO BE BALANCED."

35. PUJA ADDED THAT HE KNEW THAT SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN  
COUNTRIES RESIST PROGRESS ON MBFR MORE THAN THE U.S.  
AND THAT IT WAS THE FORMER THAT HAD OPPOSED THE INCLUSION  
OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT HUNGARY, ACCORDING TO  
FONMIN, CANNOT OVERLOOK FACT THAT 50 PERCENT OF NATO  
GROUND FORCES ARE WEST GERMAN AND "YOU KNOW WHAT COULD  
HAPPEN IF AFTER SEPTEMBER 1976 ELECTIONS THERE WERE A  
CHANGE IN THE FRG GOVERNMENT."

36. TURNING TO CUBA, PUJA SAID ITS ARMY REPRESENTS NO  
DANGER WHATEVER TO LATIN AMERICA OR TO THE UNITED STATES.  
WHEN THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT DEEMS IT DESIRABLE THEY WILL  
ASK CUBANS TO RETURN HOME, AND THEY WILL DO SO. CUBANS  
WOULD NOT HAVE GONE THERE, HE CONTINUED, WITHOUT BEING  
INVITED OR WITHOUT PREVIOUS SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED INTERVENTION.  
NO ONE SHOULD DESCRIBE ANGOLA CONFLICT AS CIVIL WAR WHEN  
ALMOST HALF ITS TERRITORY HAD BEEN "INVADED" BY SOUTH  
AFRICAN TROOPS WHO HAD EVEN CONDUCTED RAIDS CLOSE TO  
LUANDA.

37. "CUBA, YOU CAN UNDERSTAND, HAS NOT FORGOTTEN 1962  
--THEY HAD TO BUILD UP A BIG ARMY THEN. NEVERTHELESS IT  
IS A FACT THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN CUBAN  
FOREIGN POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE  
ON THEIR POSITION ABOUT GUERILLA WARFARE. WE CONSIDER  
THIS CHANGE AS A POSITIVE ONE." PUJA SAID HE COULD  
UNDERSTAND U.S. CONCERN AND SUSPICIONS ABOUT CUBAN  
INTENTIONS, BUT THAT THE GOH WAS CONFIDENT THAT NO "FURTHER  
COMPLICATIONS" WILL ARISE AND THAT FUTURE WILL SHOW THAT  
U.S. HAS NO REASON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT CUBA'S  
AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS.

38. MCAULIFFE SAID AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS OFTEN  
CONFUSE MANY FOREIGNERS, EVEN OUR NEAR NEIGHBORS AND  
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CLOSE ALLIES. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THOSE ABROAD TO APPRECIATE THAT CANDIDATES FOR NATIONAL OFFICE ARE OFFERING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OPTIONS ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. FROM THAT LIVELY AND EXTENDED DEBATE IN MANY PLACES THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AND CANDIDATES FOR CONGRESSIONAL SEATS WILL EMERGE; AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE PROVED FOR TWO CENTURIES THAT THEY ARE POSSESSED OF A GREAT DEAL OF COMMON SENSE WILL MAKE THEIR CHOICES KNOWN.

39. ON CUBA, MCAULIFFE SAID HE FELT COMPELLED TO REPEAT THE FACTS: A CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OF MORE THAN 10,000 SOLDIERS HAD TRAVERSED THE BROAD ATLANTIC TO INTERVENE AND SCORE A DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY IN AN ARICAN CIVIL WAR. THE EXISTENCE, THE READINESS, THE MOBILITY OF SUCH A MILITARY FORCE REVEALS A LOT ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT HUNGARY OR POLAND, FOR EXAMPLE, POSSESSED THE MILITARY MEANS TO MOUNT A SIMILAR OPERATION IN ANGOLA. NO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY--NOT EVEN BRAZIL OR ARGENTINA OR VENEZUELA--HASMOUNTED A COMPARABLE MILITARY OPERATION WITH ALL THE LOGISTIC AND OTHER SUPPORT THAT EXPEDITIONARY FORCES REQUIRE. PUJA MADE SOME NOTES BUT DID NOT REPLY.  
MCAULIFFE

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 15 MAR 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** saccheem  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976BUDAPE00789  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760097-0271  
**From:** BUDAPEST  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760361/aaaacbyf.tel  
**Line Count:** 899  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 17  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 STATE 56285, 76 BUDAPEST 755  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** saccheem  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 OCT 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by saccheem>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MARCH 10 CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN PUJA: TOUR D'HORIZON  
**TAGS:** PFOR, HU, US, CSCE, (PUJA, FRIGYES)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006